Recent economic analyses of choices among potentially hazardous jobs have generalized Adam Smith's notion of compensating wage differentials to probabilistic contexts. The study by Oi (1973) views adverse job consequences as being tantamount to a drop in income. He concludes that jobs posing greater risks will command compensating wage differentials. A more detailed analysis along similar lines is presented by Thaler and Rosen (1976) , who develop Oi's approach and also consider the situation in which individuals face lotteries on life and death.2 The payoff after an adverse outcome (death) is represented by a bequest function. The approach taken here also can be viewed as a probabilistic generalization of the compensating differential analysis. It differs in that individuals' utility functions are assumed to be dependent on one's health state. The static model in this section illustrates the properties of the optimal job choice of a worker who is choosing from a set of job opportunities that involve the same number of work hours but have differing probabilities of an adverse consequence.3 This approach does not impose assumptions that are unduly restrictive since most job opportunities offer little individual leeway in the choice of hours. 'The recent investigations by Smith (1976) and by Thaler and Rosen (1976) consider wage premiums for death risks faced by workers. An earlier study of skill differentials is that of Reder (1962) . 2Thaler and Rosen (1976) also set up, but do not fully develop, a more general model in which there are N possible outcomes.
3Theoretically, there is little that can be said about a fully generalized multi-attribute case that does not represent a straightforward extension of this simple model. Perhaps the most important implication of a generalized model is that a worker should be cognizant of the entire portfolio of risky actions and should not make piecemeal decisions when strong interdependencies are involved.
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For simplicity, assume that there is no income uncertainty associated with any particular job. Although the wage rate is known, the health state resulting from one's activities is determined probabilistically. In this simple model, one's health does not affect one's earnings. Two health states will be considered. State 1 refers to good health, while state 2 refers to ill health, such as being injured. The individual's objective is to select the job that maximizes his expected utility.
This formulation of worker preferences permits the marginal utility of consumption (or alternatively of wealth) to differ according to one's health status. An alternative approach of using a conventional utility function that depends on wealth alone could be employed in the job injury context by viewing an injury as being tantamount to a drop in wealth. However, if utility functions are assumed to be of the usual concave 'form, this formulation would imply that the marginal utility of income is less when a person is healthy than when he is not.
The shortcomings of this approach become particularly apparent if actuarially fair income insurance is available. Workers will, of course, equate the marginal utility of income in the two possible states. In a model in which health and safety impacts have monetary equivalents, the absolute level of the individual's welfare will be identical irrespective of the job outcome. If, however, worker utility functions are allowed to vary according to the worker's health, such a result need not occur, as lower welfare levels for the unhealthy state may result.4
The notation to be used in analyzing the worker's choice problem is summarized below: uj = the utility function in health state j, where j = 1,2; x = the composite -consumption good whose price equals one; p = the probability of the unattractive state 2 occurring; w(p) =the wage for a job offering probability p of state 2 occurring; A = initial assets; A=the shadow price of the goods constraint.
Letter subscripts on the ui and w terms indicate partial derivatives. The uj's and w(p) functions are assumed to be continuous and twice differentiable. The wage schedule w(p) represents the highest wage available for a job with probability p of injury.5 The worker receives the same wage for his job irrespective of the actual health impact. The possibility of purchasing insurance has been excluded in the interest of analytic implicity.6 It should be noted, however, that non-discretionary insurance benefits, such as workmen's compensation, are not omitted since the state-dependent utility functions encompass influences such as these. Suppose that workers must select from a range of job alternatives that are equally attractive in terms of their time allocations but which offer different probabilities of unfavorable state 2 occurring. This range is assumed to be continuous and to span all values of p. The set of alternatives that must be considered can be restricted to the efficient set of jobs that offer the highest value of w for any value of p. The worker's optimal choice from among the market alternatives is determined by maximizing the Lagrangian given by
The job with the optimal risk p is determined by solving the following first-order conditions for a maximum (as well as the budget constraint):
and L =O=-uP+u2-w 
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The necessary condition for an interior maximum is that a marginal increase in the wage as a result of the increased job risk be positive and equal to the difference in the two states' utilities divided by the expected marginal utility of consumption.7 Thus the job market equilibrium function w(p) is necessarily an increasing function of p if workers are employed at each level of p. Jobs with identical stochastic properties will be rewarded equally in equilibrium.8 The positive sign of w is a result of the nature of the job choice problem. It is not an assumption. The derivation of this result did not require that workers be risk averters. The only key assumption required was that the good health state be more desirable than the ill health state.9
To assure that a solution to equation (3) is indeed a maximum, the second-order condition also must be fulfilled. In mathematical terms, the marginal rate of change of w with respect to further increases inp must be either negative or positive, but not too large:
The right hand side of equation (4) is positive, assuming plausible restrictions on the utility function. In particular, I will assume throughout this section that the marginal utility of consumption is diminishing (i.e., uL <0 and ux2x < 0) and that the marginal utility of consumption is greater in the healthy state than in the injured state (i.e., ux > ux2 > 0). This model can also be profitably applied to ascertain the influence of one's initial wealth on the level of job hazards one will select. The positive relationship between individual wealth and the attractiveness of the nonmonetary attributes of one's job has long been noted by labor market analysts, such as Reder (1962 To determine the relationship of one's assets to the optimal probability of injury, one can totally differentiate the first-order conditions (equations (1) and (2) and the budget constraint), and solve for dp/dA using Cramer's rule, producing the result that Since the numerator is clearly positive, the sign of dp/dA is the same as that of the denominator. Hazardous jobs will be an inferior occupational pursuit, as is plausible, if 9If one uses a model with a single utility function (not conditional on one's health) in which job risk outcomes are viewed as monetary equivalents, w is positive so long as u'> 0 and the argument of u is greafer when the worker is not injured on the job. This property is quite unrestrictive and implies nothing whatsoever about the risk aversion, or lack thereof, on the part of the worker. For this single-argument case, the worker is said to be risk-averse if u"<O. The second-order conditions for a maximum impose other restrictions, but do not require risk aversion. For simplicity, I will assume that the marginal utility of consumption is diminishing. Conditions (SWC). The SWC, which provides the most detailed information available concerning the nature of the individual's job, was a national survey of 1,533 workers that was undertaken from December 1969 to January 1970. Farmers and self-employed workers were excluded from the subsample that I considered since they did not respond to the job characteristic questions. In addition, white collar workers were also excluded from the analysis since the job characteristic questions asked were inappropriate for this group.'0 There were 496 full-time blue collar workers in the subsample that was analyzed.
As the data in table 1 indicate, the subsample being considered reflects substantial geographical and occupational diversity. The 3 locational categories listed comprise the 0-1 dummy variable list LOCA TE. In terms of industrial distribution, the sample is also fairly representative, as large numbers of manufacturing and service workers were included in the survey. The industrial breakdown given is at an aggregative level. For the empirical analysis, a finer categorization by SIC code for the worker's industry was used to construct a list of 25 0-1 dummy variables that I will refer to as INDUSTRY. Over three-fourths of the workers were either operatives or craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers. The first 4 of these occupational categories were used to construct the 0-1 dummy variable list JOB.
The characteristics of the key variables used in the subsequent analysis are summarized in table 2. The personal characteristic information available is comparable to that found in several other large data sets. There is information pertaining to the worker's age (A GE 
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. Although this fraction is double the nationwide average for the work force as a whole, it does not appear disproportionately large for the blue collar, non-farm population.
The most distinctive feature of the data set is the extensive information pertaining to the worker's job: number of employees at the enterprise (SIZE), union membership (UN-ION) , whether the worker is a supervisor (SUPER), whether the job requires that the employee work fast (FAST), whether the worker is not allowed to make decisions (NODEC), whether the job requires that the worker not make mistakes (MISTK), job security (SECURITY), overtime work (OVERT), and training program availability (TRAIN). These variables pertain to the worker's particular job, not broadly defined industrial and occupational groups. The availability of these job characteristic variables enables one to obtain estimates of job risk premiums that are not subject to the severe omitted variables bias that might be present if one included no other job attributes in the analysis.
The self-assessed danger variable (DAN-GER) also pertains to the individual's particular job. This job risk measure is the dummy variable for whether or not the worker's job exposes him to dangerous or unhealthy conditions. As indicated in table 2, just over half of the workers considered their jobs to be hazardous-a result that casts doubt on the common assumption that workers systematically under-assess job risks. Detailed examination of the hazards cited revealed that the risks are consistent with the individual's particular job. For example, temperature and humidity extremes are cited by a truck driver for a canning company, inadequate shoring is listed by a construction worker, and slippery floors and footing are cited by a manufacturing worker in the plastic products industry. Experimentation with variables pertaining to the number or type of hazards cited by the worker did not yield results superior to the DANGER variable.
The principal advantage of this variable is that it is not an objective index but rather the subjective assessment of the risk, the magnitude that motivates individual behavior. To the extent that DANGER pertains to the individual's particular job, it is likely to be subject to less measurement error than would an average risk figure for the worker's industry or occupation. The principal limitation of the variable is that it does not reflect the differing severities and likelihoods of the hazards faced. Ideally, one would like the subjective probability assessments for a variety of health state outcomes, not a 0-1 dummy variable pertaining to the presence of hazards.
An statistics. In contrast, the hazards included in DANGER are divided roughly evenly between health hazards (e.g., noise and noxious fumes) and safety hazards (e.g., slippery staircases).
IV. An Assessment of Compensating Earnings Differentials
Recent analyses by Thaler and Rosen (1976) and by Smith (1976) The other job characteristic variables included in the regressions serve two functions. First, they control for a variety of job attributes, thus reducing the bias in the job hazard variables' coefficients. Second, they provide additional tests of the validity of the theory of compensating differentials.
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The coefficients associated with these variables reflect the expected patterns of influence. Supervisors (SUPER) are paid more, as are employees whose jobs require them to work fast (FAST), who work overtime (OVERT), or who work for enterprises with training programs (TRAIN). Workers who do not make decisions (NODEC) and whose jobs require them not to make mistakes (MISTK) tend to be paid somewhat less, which is consistent with the lighter tasks and lower level assembly line work associated with these characteristics. The only variable with a sign opposite of what one might expect on the basis of the compensating differentials analysis is SECURITY. However, the higher earnings of individuals with job security is quite consistent with the greater security associated with upper level blue collar positions. This variable thus may be capturing primarily the relative ranking of the worker's job rather than any particular job attribute that is not appropriately compensated.
V. The Role of Worker Assets
The second major prediction of the conceptual analysis is that the optimal job risk will necessarily decrease with the worker's wealth, provided that certain mild restrictions on the worker's preferences and employment opportunities are imposed. The validity of this result cannot be tested using the SWC data since the survey did not include a worker wealth variable. One can, however, use the 1969 data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Men in conjunction with the 1969 BLS industry injury rates to ascertain whether there is any systematic relationship between the injury rate of the worker's industry and his wealth.
The sample to be considered consists of 1,932 males who were 45-59 years old when the survey began in 1966 and had a mean age of 53.7 in 1969. The dependent variable for the analysis is INJRA TE. The independent variables used either have the same definitions as do the SWC variables (AGE, EDUC) or else are self-explanatory (NONWHITE). The explanatory variable of greatest interest is ASSETS, which is the worker's net asset position. ASSETS has a mean value of $21,717. Table 5 reports the regression results. A'SSETS has a statistically significant coefficient with the expected sign. The magnitude of the effect is rather small, however, since these results imply that the elasticity of the industry injury frequency rate with respect to worker wealth is only -0.011. This finding is likely to understate the wealth effect since it captures the influence of wealth only on the worker's choice of an industry. One might expect that much of the wealth effect would be reflected in the individual's occupation or particular job within the industry. It should be noted that the direction rather than the magnitude of the impact is of central concern since the negative elasticity estimate provides additional support of the validity of the overall conceptualization of individual choice. 
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VI. Conclusions
The conceptual analysis of individual choice among potentially hazardous jobs indicated that the optimal job risk for a worker should be negatively related to his wealth and that workers will demand earnings premiums for hazardous jobs-a result originally articulated by Adam Smith. The empirical analysis provided strong support for these conceptual results. The annual earnings premium for job hazards averaged $400 in 1969. This value is not particularly low in view of the large number of workers who viewed their jobs as being hazardous. The injury rate for an employee's industry also was negatively related to worker assets, although the effect was not as large as one would expect if more appropriate data were available to evaluate the magnitude of this relationshin.
